Abstract. We consider the problem of cheating in secret sharing schemes, cheating in which individuals submit forged shares in the secret reconstruction phase in an effort to make another participant reconstruct an invalid secret. We introduce a novel technique which uses universal hash functions to detect such cheating and propose two efficient secret sharing schemes that employ the functions. The first scheme is nearly optimum with respect to the size of shares; that is, the size of shares is only one bit longer than its existing lower bound. The second scheme possesses a particular merit in that the parameter for the probability of successful cheating can be chosen without regard to the size of the secret. Further, the proposed schemes are proven to be secure regardless of the probability distribution of the secret.
Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic primitive in which a secret is divided into shares and distributed among participants in such a way that only a qualified set of participants can recover the secret. It is a fundamental building block for many cryptographic protocols and is often used in the general composition of secure multiparty computations. While seminal papers were presented by Shamir [10] and Blakley [1] more than a quarter century ago, because of its importance in cryptography, it is still being studied actively today.
Tompa and Woll have pointed out that in Shamir's k-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme, even a single user can fool other participants by submitting invalid shares at the secret reconstruction phase. They also proposed a scheme which can detect the fact of cheating when invalid shares are submitted at that point. Ogata, Kurosawa and Stinson also have presented an efficient scheme for detecting cheating [8] . While the size of shares in their scheme is proven to be optimum, the scheme is proven to be secure only if the secret is uniformly distributed, and the size of the secret will restrict possible value for the successful cheating probability.
In this paper, we propose two efficient k-out-of-n threshold secret sharing schemes which are secure regardless of the probability distribution of the secret. The first scheme is nearly optimum with respect to the size of shares; that is, the size of shares is only one bit longer than its existing bound. In the second scheme, the size of shares is somewhat larger than the first scheme, but the second scheme possesses a particular merit in that the successful cheating probability can be chosen without regard to the size of the secret. This is not the case in either the first scheme or the scheme in [8] . The size of shares in the second scheme is much smaller than that in the scheme by Tompa and Woll, which is also secure for arbitrary secret distribution and whose successful cheating probability can be also chosen without regard to the size of the secret. The size of shares in the second scheme will be even smaller than that in [8] when > |S| −1/2 , where denotes the successful cheating probability and S denotes the set of secrets 1 . This interesting phenomenon results from inflexibility of parameter values in [8] . Note that the condition > |S| −1/2 is quite reasonable since is usually required to be 2 −128 or 2 −256 , whereas the the size of the secret can be as large as |S| = 2 1024 or more. The main idea of the proposed schemes is to use universal hash functions (more precisely, a variant of ASU 2 , an almost strongly universal class of hash functions) for cheating detection. Here, the key for the universal hash functions is distributedly shared together with the share of the secret. In reconstructing the secret, both the secret and the key are reconstructed, and each participant verifies that the secret and the hash value are consistent. We additionally provide some techniques to reduce the size of shares and to prevent the hash value from revealing any information about the secret.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review models of secret sharing schemes capable of detecting cheating, and we discuss previous works done on them. In Section 3, we introduce a novel technique for detecting cheating via a universal hash family, and we present efficient schemes based on it. In Section 4, we describe two generalizations of the schemes presented in Section 3. In Section 5, we introduce new models which deal with more powerful cheaters than those in existing models, and we present schemes secure in the new models. In Section 6, we summarize our work.
Preliminaries

Secret Sharing Schemes
In secret sharing schemes, there are n participants P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } and a dealer D. The set of participants who are allowed to reconstruct the secret is characterized by an access structure Γ ⊆ 2 P ; that is, participants P i1 , . . . , P i k are allowed to reconstruct the secret if and only if {P i1 , . . . , P i k } ∈ Γ (for instance, the access structure of a k-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme is defined by Γ = {A | A ∈ 2 P , |A| ≥ k}.) A model consists of two algorithms: ShareGen and Reconst. Share generation algorithm ShareGen takes a secret s ∈ S as input and outputs a list (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ). Each v i ∈ V i is called a share and is given to a participant P i . Ordinarily, ShareGen is invoked by the dealer. Secret reconstruction algorithm Reconst takes a list of shares and outputs a secret s ∈ S.
A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if the following two conditions are satisfied for the output (v 1 , . . . , v n ) of ShareGen(ŝ) where the probabilities are taken over the random tape of ShareGen.
for any s ∈ S.
Secret Sharing Schemes Secure against Cheating
A secret sharing schemes capable of detecting cheating was first presented by Tompa and Woll [12] . They considered the scenario in which cheaters who do not belong to the access structure submit forged shares in the secret reconstruction phase. Such cheaters will succeed if another participants in the reconstruction accepts an incorrect secret 2 . There are two different models for secret sharing schemes capable of detecting such cheating. Carpentieri, De Santis and Vaccaro [3] first considered a model in which cheaters who know the secret try to make another participant reconstruct an invalid secret. We call this model the "CDV model." Recently, Ogata, Kurosawa and Stinson [8] introduced a model with weaker cheaters who do not know the secret in forging their shares. We call this model the "OKS model."
As in ordinary secret sharing schemes, each of these models consists of two algorithms. A share generation algorithm ShareGen is the same as that in the ordinary secret sharing schemes. A secret reconstruction algorithm Reconst is slightly changed: it takes a list of shares as input and outputs either a secret or the special symbol ⊥ (⊥ ∈ S.) Reconst outputs ⊥ if and only if cheating has been detected. To formalize the models, we define the following simple game for any (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme SS = (ShareGen, Reconst) and for any (not necessarily polynomially bounded) Turing machine A = (A 1 , A 2 ), where A represents cheaters P i1 , . . . , P i k−1 who try to cheat P i k . Please note that in this section and the next we will focus on the (k, n) threshold type access structure. A more general access structure will be discussed in Section 4.
Game(SS, A)
s ← S; // according to the probability distribution over S.
The advantage of cheaters is expressed as Adv(SS,
and the probability is taken over the distribution of S, and over the random tapes of ShareGen and A. 
Previous Work
In this subsection, we briefly review the known bounds and constructions of (k, n, )-secure secret sharing schemes. A lower bound for the size of shares in the CDV model is described as follows: The following corollary may be seen to be straightforward from Proposition 2 since it has to hold for a uniformly distributed secret. Because it is in general difficult to determine exact probability distributions, we do not consider here situations in which the share generation algorithm knows the secret distribution and shares are generated according to the distribution 3 . Within the OKS model, Ogata et al. have proposed an elegant (k, n, OKS )-secure secret sharing schemes that satisfies the bound of Proposition 3 with equality [8] . The construction is summarized by the following proposition (please refer to [7] for the definition of difference set.) However, there are two drawbacks in the scheme of [8] . The first is that the scheme is proven to be secure only if the secret is uniformly distributed. This drawback comes from the property of the scheme that the share of the target participant can be uniquely determined from the shares of k − 1 cheaters and the secret. Therefore, if there exists a secret which occurs with high probability then cheaters can guess the share of the target participant also with high probability, which causes the successful cheating probability larger than what is expected when the secret is uniformly distributed. The second drawback is that the successful cheating probability is uniquely determined from the size of the secret; that is, OKS is determined to be OKS = 1/|S| in [8] . On the other hand, the scheme by Tompa and Woll [12] which is secure in the CDV model is proven to be secure for arbitrary secret distribution and the successful cheating probability can be chosen without regard to the size of the secret. However, the size of shares is as large as
Proposed Schemes
In this section, we propose two efficient (k, n, CDV )-secure secret sharing schemes in the CDV model which are proven to be secure for any secret distribution. The first scheme is nearly optimum with respect to the size of shares; that is, the size of shares is
CDV which is only one bit longer than the bound of Corollary 1. The size of shares in the second scheme is
CDV . Though the size of share is larger than the first scheme, the second scheme possesses a particular merit in that the size of the secret and the successful cheating probability can be chosen independently.
The underlying (and yet naive) idea of the schemes is to use almost strongly universal hash functions CDV -ASU 2 for cheating detection. A family of hash functions H : A → B with the properties (1) and (2) below is called an -ASU 2 . (1) For any x ∈ A and y ∈ B, |{h e ∈ H | h e (x) = y}| = |H|/|B|. (2) For any x 1 , x 2 ( = x 1 ) ∈ A and y 1 , y 2 ∈ B, {h e ∈ H | h e (x 1 ) = y 1 , h e (x 2 ) = y 2 }| = |H|/|B|. where h e denotes the element of H indexed by the key e ∈ E (clearly |H| = |E| holds.) Now, consider the secret sharing scheme in which a randomly chosen key e ∈ E of H (where H : S → B is CDV -ASU 2 ) is shared as well as the secret s ∈ S using the Shamir's (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme and hash value b = h e (s) is open to the public. In the reconstruction phase, a secretŝ and a keyê are reconstructed and Reconst outputsŝ as the valid secret if and only if hê(ŝ) = b holds. Intuitively, the scheme seems to be (k, n, CDV )-secure in the CDV model since knowledge of the secret s does not help cheaters to computê s( = s) such that hê(ŝ) = b with probability better than CDV .
However, we must be careful about the following problems. The first problem is that the keyê ∈ E reconstructed from the shares is not always same as the original one since cheaters can forge the shares of the key for the hash functions. Therefore, we cannot prove the security of the above scheme directly from the properties of -ASU 2 . The second problem is that public (and unforgeable) storage to store the hash value b = h e (s) is not always available. If the public storage is not available then the hash value has to be included in the share of each participant, which makes the size of shares larger. Further, we must ensure that the hash value b = h e (s) does not reveal any information about the secret since the scheme is no longer perfect if it is not the case. To overcome the first problem, we choose the specific -ASU 2 which can ensure security even when the key for the hash function is forged 4 . To overcome the second and the third problem, we fix the hash value b = h e (s) to be the constant (e.g. 0,) by which we can eliminate the public storage or additional shares without any loss of security.
We use two families of hash functions to construct the schemes. The first scheme is based on the well known [11] .) The second scheme is generalization of the first scheme and is based on the hash family
Almost Optimum Scheme
The share generation algorithm ShareGen and the share reconstruction algorithm Reconst of the first scheme is described as follows where p is a prime power.
Share Generation: On input a secret s ∈ GF(p), the share generation algorithm ShareGen outputs a list of shares (v 1 , . . . , v n ) as follows:
Secret Reconstruction and Validity Check:
On input a list of k shares (v i1 , . . . , v i k ), the secret reconstruction algorithm Reconst outputs a secret s or ⊥ as follows:
The properties of the first scheme is summarized by the following theorem. 
Further, the scheme is secure for arbitrary secret distribution.
The size of shares in the first scheme is only one bit longer than the lower bound of Proposition 2 since 
A Scheme with Flexible Parameters
In the first scheme, the successful cheating probability is uniquely determined from the size of the secret. On the other hand, the successful cheating probability can be chosen without regard to the size of the secret in the second scheme. The second scheme can be described as follows. f e1 (i)) and output (v 1 , . . . , v n ) . (v i1 , . . . , v i k ) , the secret reconstruction algorithm Reconst outputs a secret s or ⊥ as follows:
Secret Reconstruction and Validity
The following theorem holds for the second scheme. Note that the successful cheating probability can be chosen flexibly by choosing the prime power p. 
. Further, the scheme is secure for arbitrary secret distribution.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume P 1 , . . . , P k−1 are cheaters and they try to cheat P k by forging their shares
We consider two cases depending on whether the cheaters know the secret. In the first case, suppose that the cheaters know the secret. The cheaters obtain the following information about e 0 and e 1 from their shares v 1 , . . . , v k−1 and the secret s ∈ S: 
Now suppose that the cheaters try to cheat P k by forging their shares to 
5 The cheaters can control s since they can compute v s,k from their shares and s.
The successful cheating probability is computed as follows:
(1) and eq. (2) hold | eq. (1) holds] = N/p .
We will show the above equation. The condition "eq. (1) and eq. (2) hold" is equivalent to "eq. (1) and eq. (3) hold" where eq. (3) is described as follows:
Now let J be the largest number such that s J = s J , then eq. (3) (1), we see that the successful cheating probability of the cheaters is upper bounded by N/p. Now we consider the second case in which the cheaters do not know the secret. In this case the successful cheating probability of the cheaters who forge their shares from Note that the above proof includes the proof for Theorem 2 since the first scheme is achieved by setting N = 1 in the second scheme.
Generalization
In this section, we present more general results on the access structures and on the class of hash functions used to detect cheating.
Though the schemes presented in Section 3 only deal with (k, n) threshold type access structure, we can show that the proposed technique can be applied to any linear secret sharing schemes. A linear secret sharing scheme is a class of secret sharing schemes with the following properties: (1) The secret s is an element of a finite field F. (2) The shares (v 1 , . . . , v n ) are generated by (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ) = (s, r 1 , . . . , r t−1 )M where M is a fixed t × n matrix over F and each r i ∈ F is chosen randomly. (3) For a set of participants P = {P i1 , . . . , P ij } ∈ Γ and their shares (v i1 , . . . , v ij ), the secret s is computed by s = ∑ j k=1 c P,j · v ij where each c P,j ∈ F is a constant uniquely determined from P.
We can also generalize the class of hash function used to detect cheating. To characterize such class of hash function, we define a new class of hash function called strongly key-differential universal ( -SKDU 2 for short) as follows: Proof. Let S and E be a set of the secrets and the set of keys for -SKDU 2 , respectively and let SS 1 = (ShareGen 1 , Reconst 1 ) and SS 2 = (ShareGen 2 , Reconst 2 ) be linear secret sharing schemes over S and over E for the same access structure Γ , respectively. We construct a secret sharing scheme secure against cheaters SS = (ShareGen, Reconst) as follows.
Definition 2. A family of hash functions H : A → B is called a strongly keydifferential universal -SKDU
Share Generation: On input a secret s ∈ S, the share generation algorithm ShareGen outputs a list of shares (v 1 , . . . , v n ) as follows:
1. Choose a random e ∈ E such that h e (s) =b, which can be computed efficiently since the efficiently samplable -SKDU 2 is used. 2. Generate (v s,1 , . . . , v s,n ) ← ShareGen 1 (s) and (v e,1 , . . . , v e,n ) ← ShareGen 2 (e). t shares (v i1 , . . . , v it ) such that {P i1 , . . . , P it } ∈ Γ , the secret reconstruction algorithm Reconst outputs a secret s ∈ S or ⊥ as follows:
Secret Reconstruction and Validity Check: On input
Now we show that SS = (ShareGen, Reconst) constructed above is -secure. Without loss of generality we can assume that P = {P 1 , . . . , P t } is an element of Γ and that P 1 , . . . , P t−1 are cheaters who try to cheat P t . There are two cases to consider. In the first case, suppose that the cheaters know the secret.
Let where the last equation directly follows from eq. (4). It can be proven that the successful cheating probability is upper bounded by when the cheaters do not know the secret by the same technique used in Theorem 2.
It is easily checked that the families of hash function used in the proposed schemes of Section 3 meet the requirements of efficiently samplable -SKDU 2 .
Constructions of -SKDU 2 other than those used in the proposed schemes will be of independent interest. The following theorem shows that an -SKDU 2 (and therefore, a secret sharing scheme capable of detecting cheating) can be constructed from an -ASU 2 with additional properties. 
(2) H ∆ is linear with respect to the key; that is, h e+e (a) = h e (a) + h e (a) holds for any e, e ∈ E and for any a ∈ A.
Proof. It is well known that the family of hash functions H constructed as above is -ASU 2 (please refer to [11] for the proof.) Letb be an arbitrary element of B then we will show that H satisfies the conditions of an efficiently samplable -SKDU 2 . First, it is easy to see that e 0 and e 1 such that h e0,e1 (a) =b is efficiently samplable by choosing e 0 ∈ E randomly and by computing e 1 =b − h e0 (a). Next, we show that eq. (4) holds for H. Since H is constructed based on H ∆ with the property h e+e (a) = h e (a) + h e (a) for any h ∈ H ∆ , h e0+c0,e1+c1 (a) = h e0+c0 (a) + (e 1 + c 1 ) = (h e0 (a) + e 1 ) + (h c0 (a) + c 1 ) = h e0,e1 (a) + h c0,c1 (a) holds for any a ∈ A and for any (e 0 , e 1 ), (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ E × B. Therefore, the following equation holds. ,e1 (a) =b, h e0,e1 (a ) =b − h c0,c1 (a )}|   = |{h e0,e1 ∈ H | h e0,e1 (a) =b, h e0,e1 (a ) Please note that the family of hash function used in the first scheme is constructed based on Theorem 4, whereas the family of hash function used in the second scheme is not. Therefore, we see that SKDU 2 can be constructed by other means than Theorem 4.
Coping with More Powerful Cheaters
In this section, we consider the models with more powerful cheaters than those in the OKS and the CDV models and we present secure schemes against them. In the OKS model and the CDV model, the secret reconstruction algorithm Reconst is defined to take only a list of share (v i1 , . . . , v i k ) as input. In actual schemes, however, the identities of the owners i 1 , . . . , i k are usually required to reconstruct the secret. This means that we implicitly assume there exist means to know the correct identities of share holders in the secret reconstruction phase of both the OKS and the CDV models. In the real life, however, it is very difficult to realize an identification scheme secure against adversaries with unlimited computational power. Therefore, it is highly desired to construct secret sharing schemes capable of detecting cheating without relying on secure identification.
To this end, we define new models: the OKS + model and the CDV + model which are slight modifications of the OKS model and the CDV model, respectively. In both new models, we modify a secret reconstruction algorithm Reconst and a game Game + of cheaters A = (A 1 , A 2 ) against SS = (ShareGen, Reconst) as follows. The secret reconstruction algorithm Reconst takes a list ((i 1 , v i1 ), (i 2 , v i2 ) , . . . , (i k , v i k )) of pairs of an identity i and a share v i of P i . Cheaters in the new models are allowed to forge their identities as well as their shares. To characterize such cheaters, a game Game + is defined as follows.
// according to the probability distribution over S.
The advantage of cheaters is redefined by Adv(SS, A) = Pr[s ∈ S∧s = s], where
) and the probability is taken over the distribution of S, and over the random tapes of ShareGen and A.
Note that all the bounds for the OKS model (resp., the CDV model) (e.g. Propositions 1-3 and Corollary 1) are also valid for OKS + model (resp., the CDV + model) since a scheme secure in the OKS + model (resp., the CDV + model) are also secure in the OKS model (resp., the CDV model.) Though the schemes secure in the OKS model (resp., the CDV model) are not necessarily secure in the OKS + model (resp., the CDV + model,) the scheme presented in [8] can be proven to be secure in the OKS + model and the scheme presented in [12] can be proven to be secure in the CDV + model. With respect to the proposed schemes, the first scheme can be shown to be secure in the CDV + model. However, the second scheme is not secure in the CDV + model. This is because the security proof of the second scheme strongly relies on the fact that the cheaters can not manipulate the Lagrange coefficient L k , which is not the case in the CDV + model. When cheaters can manipulate the Lagrange coefficient as they want, they will succeed in cheating with probability one, which is possible by forging the Lagrange coefficient (2) and by adjusting s j , C 0 and C 1 to make eq. (2) equivalent to eq. (1).
The good news is that the second scheme secure can be made secure in CDV + model by slight modification. The main idea of the modified scheme is to introduce a constant padding to a hash function. Specifically, we choose a key e of a hash families with which h e (s 1 , . . . , s N , 1, 1, 0, 1) = 0 instead of choosing a key such that h e (s 1 , . . . , s N ) = 0 as in the second scheme. In this modified scheme, we can show that cheaters cannot make eq. (2) 
Secret Reconstruction and Validity Check:
On input a list of k pair of identities and shares ((i 1 , v i1 ) , . . . , (i k v i k )), the secret reconstruction algorithm Reconst outputs a secret s or ⊥ according to the following procedure. 
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2. Let P j (1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) be cheaters who try to cheat P k by forging their identities j to i j ( = k) and corresponding shares to
As in the proof of Theorem 2, we consider two cases depending on whether the cheaters know the secret. In the first case, suppose that the cheaters know the secret. The cheaters obtain the following information about e 0 and e 1 from their shares v 1 , . . . , v k−1 and the secret s ∈ S: 
is known to the cheaters. Then we have the following equality.
Now suppose the cheaters 
The successful cheating probability is computed by = Pr[s ∈ S ∧ s = s] = Pr[eq. (5) and eq. (6) hold | eq. (5) holds]. We will show that = (N + 4)/p. First, assume that eq. (5) is not equivalent to eq. (6) (i.e. L k × eq. (5) is not identical to L k × eq. (6).) In this case, is proven to be (N + 4)/p by similar discussion to the proof of Theorem 2. Next, we will show that if the cheaters make eq. (6) 
From eq. (7) and eq. (8) we have L
and C 1 /L k = C 1 /L k . Using these relations eq. (7)-eq. (10) can be rewritten as follows.
The above equalities holds if and only if L k = L k and C 1 = C 1 . Further, s j = s j (for 1 ≤ j ≤ N ) can be also derived from the condition that the coefficients of v j k in eq. (5) and eq. (6) are identical. Finally, C 0 = C 0 is derived from the condition that the constant terms of eq. (5) and eq. (6) The following theorem gives a generalized result analogous to Theorem 3.
